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I. Introduction
The first section of this survey examines significant decisions from U.S. courts in 2010
that will be of interest to practitioners in the field of international commercial arbitration.
In particular, the U.S. Supreme Court issued three noteworthy decisions construing the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and addressing whether issues concerning arbitrability were
for the courts or the arbitrators to decide. There were also several noteworthy decisions
addressing the application of arbitration clauses to non-parties, the status of "manifest
disregard of the law" as a ground for vacatur of arbitral awards, and the availability of
injunctive relief and discovery in aid of arbitration. A number of courts vacated arbitra-
tion awards. In another noteworthy development with potentially far-reaching implica-
tions, the English Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause requiring the parties to
appoint only members from an identified community is discriminatory, and thus void.
The French Cour de Cassation, on the other hand, overturned a decision setting aside an
International Chamber of Commerce partial award on the grounds that the arbitral tribu-
nal had been irregularly constituted.
The second section of this survey looks at major developments from 2010 in the field of
investment treaty arbitration. Important jurisdictional decisions included the provisional
application of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Yukos shareholder cases, as well as the
adoption by many tribunals of an objective definition of "investment" under the ICSID
Convention. In awards on the merits, several tribunals addressed issues relating to fair
and equitable treatment claims, including the issue of legitimate expectations, and one
tribunal considered an argument raising protection of human rights under the defense of
necessity. There were also several controversial annulment decisions, including one deci-
sion finding manifest excess of powers for disregard of the applicable law and another
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finding insufficient disclosure of conflicts of interest, as well as several decisions on chal-
lenges to appointment of counsel and requests for provisional measures.
In other developments, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
adopted the revised United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL) Arbitration Rules, while the International Bar Association adopted the revised IBA
Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration. Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Ireland adopted new arbitration laws.
H. Arbitration Developments in U.S. Courts
A. INTERPRETATION AND ENFORcEMENT OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
1. Challenges to Validity of the Arbitration Agreement
In Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Antonio,] the U.S. Supreme Court once again refined the
law on issues of arbitrability and whether such issues are for the arbitrators or the courts
to decide. The parties entered into a stand-alone agreement to arbitrate that contained a
"delegation clause" providing that the arbitrator "shall have exclusive authority to resolve
any dispute relating to the. . enforceability. . .of [the] Agreement including.. .any claim
that all or any part of [the] Agreement is void or voidable." 2 In light of this clause, the
Supreme Court held that the question of whether the arbitration agreement was uncon-
scionable (and thus unenforceable) was a question for the arbitrator to decide.3
Noting that parties can agree to arbitrate "gateway" questions of arbitrability, the Court
considered whether the delegation clause was valid under FAA section two.4 The Court
distinguished two types of validity challenges-those that challenge the contract as a
whole, and those that challenge the agreement to arbitrate itself.5 Only the latter are
reserved to the courts; if a party challenges the contract as a whole, a court must refer the
issue of validity to arbitration.6 Because the defendant sought to enforce the provision of
the parties' arbitration agreement that gave the arbitrators the exclusive authority to re-
solve any dispute relating to enforceability, while the plaintiffs unconscionability chal-
lenge was directed to the validity of the arbitration agreement as a whole, the delegation
provision had to be enforced and the validity question was for the arbitrators to decide.7
That the parties' agreement was a stand-alone agreement to arbitrate was of no conse-
quence: "Application of the severability rule does not depend on the substance of the
remainder of the contract."
1. 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010).
2. Id. at 2777.
3. Id. at 2775.
4. Id. at 2777-78.
5. Id. at 2778.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 2779.
8. Id.
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2. Disputes Covered by the Arbitration Agreement
In Granite Rock Co. v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,9 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether courts or arbitrators should determine the date on which an agreement to
arbitrate was formed in the context of a dispute regarding when a union ratified a collec-
tive bargaining agreement (CBA) containing the arbitration clause. 10 In reversing the
court of appeals, the Court explained that the question of when the CBA was ratified (and
thus formed) required judicial resolution because the date of ratification-either July 2004
or August 2004-determined whether the parties had consented to arbitrate claims con-
cerning a strike in July." The federal policy in favor of arbitration did not compel a
different result: Supreme Court precedent has "never held that this policy overrides the
principle that a court may submit to arbitration 'only those disputes. . .that the parties
have agreed to submit."" 2 Moreover, the Court explained, the ratification date dispute
did not "arise under" the CBA, because the date determined whether the CBA had even
been formed when the acts giving rise to the claims took place.13
3. Parties Covered by the Arbitration Agreement
Two U.S. courts of appeal evaluated the applicability of arbitration clauses to non-signa-
tories. In Todd v. S.S. Mutual Underwriting Association (Bermuda),14 the Fifth Circuit held
that non-signatories to arbitration agreements may sometimes be compelled to arbitrate.
Citing the Supreme Court's decision in Arthur Anderson LLP v. Carlisle,'5 the Fifth Circuit
concluded that "Carlisle has called into question [the Circuit's prior holding] . . . that
direct action plaintiffs cannot be required to arbitrate as third party beneficiaries of insur-
ance contracts."' 6 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case to the district court
for further consideration.' 7
In Baker & Taylor, Inc. v. AlphaCraze.Com Corp.,' 8 the Second Circuit rejected an unu-
sual motion filed by non-signatory defendants who sought to compel arbitration between
the signatories but not participate in the arbitration themselves. In reversing the district
court's decision and reinstating the claims against the non-signatory defendants, the Sec-
ond Circuit held that, because the defendants had disclaimed any right to arbitration
under the governing agreement, they could not rely on the arbitration clause to compel
the signatories to arbitrate.19
9. 130 S. Ct. 2847 (2010).
10. Although the case arose under federal labor law, the Supreme Court relied upon FAA precedents "be-
cause they employ the same rules of arbitrability that govern labor cases." Id. at 2857 n.6.
11. Id. at 2860-61.
12. Id. at 2859.
13. Id. at 2861.
14. 601 F.3d 329 (5th Cir. 2010).
15. 129 S. Ct. 1896 (2009).
16. Todd, 601 F.3d at 335.
17. Id. at 336.
18. 602 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2010).
19. Id. at 491-92.
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B. ENFORCEMENT OF AWARDs
1. U.S. Decisions Addressing the Scope of Arbitrators' and Courts' Authority
In Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.,20 the Supreme Court addressed the
comparatively novel issue of whether class arbitration was contemplated by a standard
arbitration clause. After the plaintiff filed a demand for class arbitration, the parties stipu-
lated that their arbitration clause was "silent" on whether class arbitration was permissible
and that they had not reached any agreement on the issue of class arbitration.21 The
parties submitted the question of whether such arbitration was permissible to a panel of
three arbitrators who were to follow the AAA's Supplemental Rules for Class Arbitra-
tion.22 The panel considered several published arbitration awards permitting class arbitra-
tion where the arbitration clause was silent, as well as the plaintiff's argument that public
policy favored the construction of arbitration clauses to permit class arbitration, and is-
sued a partial award construing the parties' arbitration clause to permit class arbitration. 23
The Supreme Court held that the award should be vacated because the arbitrators had
"exceeded [their] powers" under FAA section 10(a)(4), 24 which applies where an arbitrator
"strays from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively 'dispense[s]
his own brand of industrial justice." 25 "Because the parties [had] agreed [that] their [con-
tract] was 'silent'" on the subject of class arbitration, the Court found that "the arbitrators'
proper task was to identify the rule of law that governs in that situation" 26 and look to the
"default rule" that would apply under either the FAA or one of the two bodies of law that
the parties had argued applied to their contract. 27 The Court found that the arbitration
panel had instead "proceeded as if it had the authority of a common-law court to develop
what it viewed as the best rule to be applied" and "simply imposed its own [view] of sound
policy" regarding class arbitration.28
The Court emphasized that the purpose of the FAA is to give effect to the parties'
intent and to enforce "private agreements to arbitrate. . .according to their terms." 29 Re-
lying on these principles, the Court concluded that "[a] party may not be compelled under
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding
that the party agreed to do so."30 The Court further held that arbitrators may not infer an
implicit agreement to authorize class arbitration "solely from the fact of the parties' agree-
ment to arbitrate. . because class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to
such a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it by simply agreeing to
submit their disputes to an arbitrator."31
20. 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
21. Id. at 1765-66.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1768-69.
24. Id. at 1767-68.
25. Id. at 1767.
26. Id. at 1768.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 1768-70.
29. Id. at 1773-76.
30. Id. at 1782.
31. Id. at 1775-76.
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2. Other Enforcement Decisions
In Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Systems, Inc., 32 the Ninth Circuit vacated a district court's
confirmation of an arbitral award after concluding that it was the result of procedures
inconsistent with the parties' agreement. The arbitration clause had provided for arbitra-
tion at "the defendant's [site]." 33 Polimaster, a Belarusian company, filed suit against RAE
Systems, which is based in California, and agreed to arbitrate the dispute in California as
provided in the arbitration clause. 34 But when RAE submitted counterclaims, Polimaster
argued that they could only be heard in Belarus, the "defendant's [site]" as to those
claims. 35 The arbitrator concluded that "defendant," as used in the arbitration clause, is
the defendant on the initial complaint.36 But the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that a
defendant is simply one who defends another party's claim for relief." It therefore con-
cluded that the contract was unambiguous in providing that the counterclaims against
Polimaster must be arbitrated in Belarus.38
In PMA Capital Insurance Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Bermuda, Ltd.,39 the Third Cir-
cuit affirmed a district court's vacatur of an arbitral award because the arbitrators had
exceeded their powers in issuing an award that was completely irrational. In that case, the
party that filed for arbitration had merely sought a declaration about the proper treatment
of certain payments under the parties' agreement.4o Instead, in a one-page award, the
arbitrators awarded $6 million in damages and ordered that the relevant provision be re-
moved from the parties' agreement.4' The district court and Third Circuit concluded
that this relief was "completely irrational."42
Two of the three arbitrators who presided over the PMA Capital arbitration also pre-
sided over a related arbitration in which they failed to disclose their involvement in PMA
Capital.43 The arbitral award in that related case was also vacated by a district court based
upon a finding of "evident partiality" on the part of the two PMA Capital arbitrators.44 By
serving on both arbitral panels, the arbitrators "could receive ex parte information," "be
influenced by recent credibility determinations," and "influence each other's thinking" on
relevant issues.45 Thus, their failure to disclose their material relationship to the related
arbitration justified vacator.46
32. 623 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2010).
33. Id. at 834.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 835.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 838.
38. Id.
39. 2010 WL 4409655 (3d Cir. Nov. 8, 2010).
40. PMA Capital Ins. Co. v. Platinum Underwriters Berm., Ltd., 659 F. Supp. 2d 631, 637-38 (E.D. Pa.
2009).
41. PAM Capital, 2010 WL 4409655, at *1.
42. Id. at *2.
43. Scandinavian Reins. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins., 2010 WL 653481 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
44. Id. at *9.
45. Id. at *8.
46. Id. at *9.
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3. Status of "Manifest Disregard of the Law" Following Hall Street
It remains unsettled whether judicially created grounds not expressly set forth in the
FAA-including manifest disregard of the law and complete irrationality-continue to be
valid grounds for vacatur of arbitral awards following the Supreme Court's 2008 decision
in Hall Street Associates, L.L.C. v. Mattel, Inc.47 The answer will likely depend on whether
"manifest disregard" and "complete irrationality" are deemed extra-statutory grounds for
vacatur-which would call their viability into doubt-or whether they instead refer collec-
tively to the grounds set forth in section 10 of the FAA, or are merely shorthand for, or a
gloss on, FAA sections 10(a)(3)-(4), which authorize vacatur when the arbitrators are
"guilty of misconduct" or "exceed[] their powers." The Supreme Court has declined to
resolve this issue,48 and circuit courts remain divided.
The Second Circuit previously affirmed the continued viability of "manifest disregard"
on the statutory "shorthand" theory, indicating that this standard is a "judicial gloss on the
specific grounds for vacatur enumerated in section 10 of the FAA."49 But, that decision
was reversed and remanded on separate grounds by the Supreme Court.50 A subsequent
Second Circuit case merely acknowledged Stolt-Nielsen's findings, stated that Hall Street
had placed "manifest disregard . . . into some doubt," and concluded that "manifest disre-
gard" was inapplicable on the facts of that case, without settling the issue.5' The Ninth52
and Sixth53 circuits have held that "manifest disregard" remains a viable ground for vaca-
tur, while the Fourth54 and Tenth55 circuits have applied the standard without squarely
addressing its continued viability. In contrast, the Fifth,56 Eighth,57 and Eleventh58 cir-
cuits have held that it is no longer a viable ground. The First Circuit stated in dicta in one
opinion that Hall Street abolished "manifest disregard," but in a subsequent opinion va-
cated an award based on the manifest disregard standard without discussing Hall Street.59
C. AvAILABILYrr OF INJUNCTIVE RELIEF IN AID OF ARBITRATION
Several federal courts have held that courts may not grant interim relief in connection
with an arbitration falling under the New York Convention. 60 But the Ninth Circuit held
in Toyo Tire Holdings of Americas, Inc. v. Continental Tire North America, Inc. that a district
court may provide "interim injunctive relief on arbitrable claims i[fl necessary to preserve
47. 552 U.S. 576 (2008).
48. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.
49. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2008).
50. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1758.
51. T.Co Metals, LLC v. Dempsey Pipe & Supply, Inc., 592 F.3d 329 (2d Cir. 2010).
52. Comedy Club Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Lagstein v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd's, 607 F.3d 634 (9th Cir. 2010).
53. Coffee Beanery, Ltd. v. WW, LLC, 300 Fed. App'x 415 (6th Cir. 2008).
54. Raymond James Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Bishop, 596 F.3d 183 (4th Cir. 2010).
55. DMA Int'l, Inc. v. Qwest Commc'ns Int'l, Inc., 585 F.3d 1341 (10th Cir. 2009).
56. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349 (5th Cir. 2009).
57. Med. Shoppe Int'l, Inc. v. Turner Invs., Inc., 614 F.3d 485 (8th Cir. 2010).
58. Frazier v. CitiFinancial Corp., LLC, 604 F.3d 1313 (1lth Cir. 2010).
59. Compare Ramos-Santiago v. UPS, 524 F.3d 120 (1st Cir. 2008), with Kashner Davidson Sec. Corp. v.
Mscisz, 531 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2008).
60. See, e.g., Simula, Inc. v. Autliv Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 726 (9th Cir. 1999); I.T.A.D. Assocs. v. Podar Bros.,
636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT, 501 F.2d 1032, 1038 (3d Cir. 1974).
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the status quo and the meaningfulness of the arbitration." 61 The Ninth Circuit distin-
guished an earlier case (Simiula, Inc. v. Autoliv Inc.) where it had found that injunctive relief
can be issued only by the arbitrator when parties have agreed to arbitration. 62 But unlike
Simula, the Toyo Tire case did not involve changing the status quo through injunctive re-
lief. The Ninth Circuit also noted that Article 23(2) of the ICC Rules explicitly permits
interim judicial relief if proper conditions are met. 63
D. AvAILABILYTY OF DIscOVERY IN AID OF ARBITRATION-28 U.S.C. § 1782
The case law is unsettled on whether evidence can be obtained in aid of an international
arbitration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782, which authorizes district courts to compel dis-
covery "for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal."64 In a series of
decisions granting requests under Section 1782 in connection with an arbitration between
Ecuador and Chevron Corporation, several district courts recently held that, in contrast to
an arbitral tribunal established by private parties, an arbitral tribunal established pursuant
to a bilateral investment treaty does qualify as a "foreign or international tribunal" for
purposes of Section 1782.65
But, in In re Caratube International Oil Co., although the district court assumed that
arbitration under a bilateral investment treaty could fall within Section 1782, it nonethe-
less exercised its discretion to deny the petition.66 The court reasoned that granting a
party's petition for discovery from a non-party would interfere with the parties' bar-
gained-for expectations concerning the arbitration process, including the adoption of the
IBA Rules on the Taking of Evidence in International Commercial Arbitration.67
III. Arbitration Developments in European Courts
A. ENGLISH COURT OF APPEAL
In Jivraj v Hasbwani,68 the Court of Appeal held that an arbitration clause requiring the
parties to appoint as arbitrators only members from the Ismaili community is discrimina-
tory and thus void. The party appointing a non-Ismaili arbitrator argued that the arbitra-
tion clause violated the Employment Equality (Religion and Belief) Regulations 2003 (the
"Regulations") and the Human Rights Act 1998. The court agreed, observing that the
61. 609 F.3d 975, 981 (9th Cir. 2010).
62. See Simula, Inc., 175 F.3d at 726.
63. Tayo Tire Holdings, 609 F.3d at 980-81.
64. 28 U.S.C. § 1782(a)(2010).
65. See In re Chevron Corp., 709 F. Supp. 2d 283, 291 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); Chevron Corp. v. Shefftz, No. 10-
mc-10352-JLT, 2010 WL 4985663, at *3 (D. Mass. Dec. 7, 2010); In re Chevron Corp., No. 10-CV-2989-
AW, 10-CV-2990-AW, 2010 WL 4880378, at *3 (D. Md. Nov. 24, 2010); In re Veiga, F. Supp. 2d, No. 10-
370, 10-371, 2010 WL 4225564, at *8 & n.12 (D.D.C. Oct. 20, 2010), appeal dismissed, No. 10-7145, 2010
WL 5140467, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 17, 2010). Cf In re Winning (HK) Shipping Co., No. 09-22659-MC,
2010 WL 1796579, at *9 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2010) (holding that an arbitral panel established by private parties
in fact satisfied § 1782 because the award was subject to court review under English arbitration law, which the
court found applied to the arbitration).
66. No 10-0285, 2010 WVL 3155822, at *3 (D.D.C. Aug. 11, 2010).
67. Id. at *4.
68. Jivraj v. Hashwani, [2010] EWCA (Civ) 712 (Eng.).
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Regulations intended to define employment "in the broadest sense," and would apply to
all contracts to perform "services of any kind." 69 The arbitrator takes on a quasi-judicial
role in doing work that is irrelevant. 70 While the court recognized that the self-employed
may be exempt, it found that arbitrators are only self-employed in the sense that their
employer changes with each contract; they are still, in some sense, controlled by an
employer.71
Although Regulation 7 exempts from the prohibition situations where the religious
identity of the employee is necessary to the employment, the Court found the exemption
inapplicable because the arbitration clause called for English law, which does not vary with
the parties' or arbitrators' religion. 72 Finally, the Court determined that the entire clause
was void because the discriminatory element could not be severed.73
B. FRENCH COUR DE CASSATION
In Tecnimont v. Avax,74 the French Cour de Cassation overturned a decision of the Paris
Court of Appeal 7s setting aside an ICC partial award on the grounds that the arbitral
tribunal had been irregularly constituted. Avax contested the independence of the tribu-
nal's chair on grounds that his law firm represented affiliates of Tecnimont before and
during the course of the arbitration. The Paris Court of Appeal rejected Tecnimont's
time-bar defense, found the challenge admissible, and held that the chair's disclosure was
not exhaustive and should have continued during the arbitration.
Without addressing the merits, the Cour de Cassation overturned that decision on a
procedural ground, striking down the court of appeal's decision on admissibility of the
challenge, and remanded Avax's challenge for reconsideration by the court of appeal in
Reims. On remand, the court of appeal in Reims will therefore have to decide anew (i)
whether it is bound by the ICC Court's decision to reject the challenge against the chair,
and (ii) whether it should enforce Article 11(2) of the ICC Rules providing that challenges
to arbitrators' independence are only admissible if submitted within thirty days from the
date the challenging party was informed of the facts on which the challenge is based.
IV. Investor-State Disputes
A. JURISDICTION AND ADMISSIBILITY
1. Provisional Application of Energy Charter Treaty
In a long-awaited award on jurisdiction concerning claims against Russia under the En-
ergy Charter Treaty (ECT), a tribunal constituted under Article 26 of the ECT held that
it possessed jurisdiction to determine the claims made by three shareholders of Yukos Oil
69. Id. 1 13.
70. Id. 91 12, 14.
71. Id. T 21.
72. Id. 1 27, 29.
73. Id. T 34.
74. Cour de cassation [Cass.][supreme court for judicial matters] le civ., Nov. 4, 2010, Bull. civ. II, No. 09-
12716 (Fr.).
75. Cour d'appel [CA][regional court of appeal] Paris, lere ch., Feb. 12, 2009, Section C. (Fr.).
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Corporation, even though the ECT had not been ratified by the Russian Parliament after
signature.76 The tribunal analyzed Article 45 of the ECT, concerning the scope of the
treaty's provisional application, and concluded that the ECT applied provisionally in its
entirety in the Russian Federation until October 19, 2009, and consequently that Russia
was bound by the investor-State arbitration provisions invoked by the claimants. 77 The
decision on provisional application is likely to have significant implications for other po-
tential claimants under the ECT as well as for the Russian Federation.
2. Investor Standing
In Mobil Corp. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela,78 the respondent challenged claimants'
standing to bring a claim on the ground that one of the claimants was a "corporation of
convenience" created for the sole purpose of gaining access to ICSID jurisdiction under
the Netherlands-Venezuela BIT. The tribunal rejected that argument, finding that all of
the claimants were nationals of the Netherlands as defined in the BIT.79 The tribunal also
rejected an argument that the corporate restructuring that led to the incorporation of the
Dutch entity was an abusive manipulation of the ICSID system, although it held that it
had no jurisdiction with respect to any dispute arising before the restructuring.80
3. Qualifying Investments
The test for establishing what is, and is not, a qualifying "investment" under the rele-
vant BIT and under the ICSID Convention continued to be a prominent subject of
debate.
In Alpha Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, an award was rendered on November, 8 2010,
in favor of the claimant (US $5.25 million).81 One of the issues was whether the loan
agreements and contracts between claimant and a Ukrainian state-owned entity consti-
tuted qualifying investments. The tribunal concluded that the claimant had made an "in-
vestment" as defined in the BIT, because, at a minimum, the claimant had a claim to
money that had been given in order to create an economic value, and this was sufficient to
meet the BIT's jurisdictional requirement. 82
The tribunal then considered the test for an "investment" as that term is used in the
ICSID Convention.83 Observing that the Convention did not define "investment," the
tribunal criticized the test applied in Salini Construttori S.p.A. v. Kingdom ofMorocco8 4 for
76. See Hulley Enter. Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Fed'n, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 1
244-398 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010); see also Yukos Universal Ltd. (Isle of Man) v. Russian Fed'n, Interim Award on
Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010); Veteran Petroleum Ltd. (Cyprus) v. Russian Fed'n,
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010).
77. See, e.g., Hulley, 1 393-98.
78. ICSID Rep. Case No. ARB/07/27, Decision on Jurisdiction (June 10, 2010).
79. Id. 144, 160.
80. Id. ' 204-06.
81. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/16, Award (Nov. 8, 2010).
82. Id. T 303.
83. Id. T 310.
84. ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 52 (July 23, 2001).
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imposing requirements not found in Article 25(1) of the Convention, specifically that the
purported investments have contributed to the host country's economic development.85
But, in Global Trading Resources Corp. and Globex International, Inc. v. Ukraine, a tribunal
held that the concept of an investment could not be defined solely by reference to party
intent; it had to adhere to an objective definition within the ICSID Convention frame-
work. 86 The tribunal held that the claimants' case failed because purchase and sale con-
tracts were not qualifying investments within the meaning of the relevant BIT,87 and also
because they could not qualify as an investment under Article 25(1) of the ICSID
Convention.8
In reaching this decision, the Global Trading Resources tribunal relied on the recent award
in Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey,89 where the tribunal concluded that the ICSID Conven-
tion provided an autonomous definition of an "investment" that could not be altered by
contract or treaty for the purposes of establishing ICSID jurisdiction.90 Significantly,
while accepting that the ICSID Convention required an investment to satisfy certain ob-
jective criteria, the Saba Fakes tribunal specifically rejected the criterion of contribution to
the host state's development. 91 The tribunal also held that the claimant did not hold legal
title over the temporary share certificates in the Turkish investment and consequently did
not have an investment within the terms of the BIT or the ICSID Convention.92
In the jurisdictional challenge to the Yukos shareholders referred to above, Russia ar-
gued that the claimants were only nominee shareholders in Yukos Oil Corporation and
that their shares did not constitute a qualifying investment.93 Russia also argued that
there was no investment because no injection of foreign capital into the state had oc-
curred.94 The tribunal found that simple legal ownership was sufficient for the purposes
of the treaty, and that there was no basis in the ECT for limiting "investments" to injec-
tions of foreign capital.95
4. Admissibility/Premature Commencement of Arbitration
The problem of whether a claim is inadmissible or fails for lack of jurisdiction if the
claimant fails to comply with the correct dispute resolution procedure arose in Burlington
Resources v. Republic of Ecuador.96 The claimant initiated ICSID arbitration under the
U.S.-Ecuador BIT, but the respondent objected to jurisdiction over certain claims for
85. Id. 1 311-12.
86. Global Trading Res. Corp. v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1 1, Award, 43 (Dec. 1, 2010) (citing
numerous authorities including Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4).
87. Id. 51.
88. Id. 56.
89. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/20, Award (July 14, 2010).
90. Id. 109 (citing Joy Mining v. Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 1 49-50
(Aug. 6, 2004)).
91. Saba Fakes, 110-11. See also LESI-Dipenta v. Algeria, ICSID Case No. AB/03/08, Award, I I. 13(iv)
(an. 10, 2005); Salini, ICSID Case No. ARB/00/4 IT 50-58.
92. Saba Fakes, 135.
93. Hulley, IT 420-21.
94. Id. 1 422.
95. Id. IT 429-31.
96. Burlington Res. Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Jurisdiction
Gune 2, 2010).
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which claimant did not give notice or attempt negotiations for a period of six months prior
to initiating arbitration, as required under the BIT.97 The tribunal found that, due to the
claimant's non-compliance, the tribunal lacked jurisdiction over the claims.98
Substantially the same issue arose in Murphy Exploration & Production Co. International v.
Republic ofEcuador.99 The claimant filed a request for arbitration on March 3, 2008, under
the U.S.-Ecuador BIT. Ecuador raised several objections to jurisdiction and admissibil-
ity, the most significant of which was that the claimant had not allowed a mandatory six-
month period to pass after informing Ecuador of the alleged breach before initiating the
arbitration.oo The claimant argued that the cooling-off period was merely a procedural
rather than jurisdictional requirement.' 0 The tribunal found in favor of Ecuador and
held that it had no jurisdiction over the dispute.102 In doing so, it rejected the approach
taken in cases such as Lauder'o3 and SGS v. Pakistan,04 which had treated consultation
periods as directory and procedural.1os
5. Rule 41(5): Objection That a Claim Is Manfestly Without Legal Merit
Two ICSID tribunals recently upheld for the first time preliminary objections made
under Article 41(5) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules, which were amended in 2006 to en-
able tribunals to dispose of claims summarily if they are "manifestly without legal merit."
In Global Trading Resources, two U.S. poultry exporters sought damages for Ukraine's fail-
ure to honor poultry sale and purchase contracts.106 Ukraine filed a preliminary objection
under Article 41(5), and the tribunal decided that the contracts could not qualify as an
investment under the ICSID Convention.0 7 Because the claims were without legal merit,
the tribunal dismissed them pursuant to Article 41(5).10
B. DECISIONS ON THE MERITS
1. Expropriation
In Kardassopoulos v. Republic of Georgia, an ICSID tribunal found that Georgia directly
expropriated a Greek investor's exclusive rights in an oil pipeline. 0 9 The tribunal found
that Georgia had failed to provide the investor due process of law.11o In defining due
process, the tribunal cited the ADC tribunal's reasoning that the legal mechanism em-
ployed "must be of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance within a
97. Id. 11 251-52.
98. Id. 11 316-18.
99. ICSID Case No. ARB/08/4, Award on Jurisdiction (Dec. 15, 2010).
100. Id. 48.
101. Id. 140.
102. Id. 1 157.
103. Id. 1 147; see also Lauder v. Czech Republic (UNCITRAL), Award 1 187 (Sept. 3, 2001).
104. Murphy, 1 148; see also SGS Soci6ti G6nfrale de Surveillance S.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pak., ICSID
Case No. ARB/01/13, Decision on Jurisdiction, 9 184 (Aug. 6, 2003).
105. Murphy, 19 147, 154.
106. See Global Trading Resources, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/1 1.
107. Id. 11 28-29, 57.
108. Id. 1 58.
109. ICSID Case No. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, Award, 91 387 (Mar. 3, 2010).
110. See id. 11 391-403.
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reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims heard."'II The tribunal
found that Georgia engaged in "[b]ack-door press reports" and "opaque" dealings that had
denied Kardassopoulos due process."12
2. Fair and Equitable Treatment
Several tribunals addressed claims for violation of the host State's obligation to provide
fair and equitable treatment (FET) to the foreign investor. Two important issues were
whether the FET standards in the relevant BITs exceeded the international minimum
standard under customary international law, and the legitimate expectations of the foreign
investors.
In Kardassopoulos, the tribunal found that the respondent had failed to satisfy its fair and
equitable treatment obligation under the Georgia-Israel BIT.113 The claimant argued
that the BIT's autonomous FET standard required a higher level of conduct than the
international minimum standard." 4 The tribunal agreed, interpreting the FET standard
in accordance with the object and purpose of the treaty, noting the language in the pream-
ble that encouraged the inflow and retention of foreign investment. ii5 The tribunal also
found that claimant had a legitimate expectation that the host State would conduct itself in
a "reasonably justifiable" manner.)16
In Suez v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal was confronted with claims of FET violations
under two BITs, one of which included the language that the obligation must be inter-
preted in accordance with "principles of international law."" 7 The tribunal found that
there was no reason to interpret the scope of either BIT provision as limited to the inter-
national minimum standard."l8 The tribunal found that an important consideration for
assessing the investors' legitimate expectations is whether they "acted in reliance upon
[the host state's] laws and regulations and changed their economic position as a result."' 9
In contrast, in AES Summit Generation Ltd. v. Republic of Hungary, the tribunal found
that the foreign investor had no legitimate expectation that the host State would not rein-
state an administrative pricing scheme for power generation.120 The AES tribunal con-
cluded that "any reasonably informed business person or investor knows that laws can
evolve in accordance with the perceived political or policy dictates of the times."'21 The
tribunal stated that, under the ECT, a violation of fair and equitable treatment would be
found only when a state's acts or omissions are manifestly unfair and unreasonable.122
111. Id. 1 396. See also ADC v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/16, Award (Oct. 2, 2006).
112. Kardassopoulos, 1J 403-04.
113. Id. 1 451.
114. Id. 1 409.
115. Id. 433.
116. Id. 1 441.
117. ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision on Liability, 1 178 (July 30, 2010).
118. Id. 9 179.
119. Id. 207.
120. ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Award, 1 9.3.34 (Sept. 23, 2010).
121. Id.
122. Id. 1 9.3.40.
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3. Effective Means of Asserting Claims and Enforcing Rights
In Cbevron Corp. v. Republic of Ecuador, the tribunal accepted Chevron's arguments that
the failure of the Ecuadorian courts to timely resolve contractual claims against the host
State violated the U.S.-Ecuador BIT obligation to provide an effective means of asserting
claims and enforcing rights.123 The tribunal found that the BIT obligation was a poten-
tially less-demanding standard than the denial of justice standard under customary inter-
national law.124 The tribunal held that undue delay and manifestly unjust decisions would
suffice to constitute a breach, with no requirement of government interference in judicial
proceedings,125 and thus found Ecuador to be in breach of the BIT based on the failure of
the Ecuadorian courts to resolve cases that had been pending for more than fifteen
years.126
4. Defense of Necessity
In Suez v. Argentine Republic, the tribunal addressed an argument by Argentina that its
measures were justified by the defense of necessity under customary international law in
order to safeguard the human right to water.127 The tribunal found: (1) that Argentina
failed to satisfy the requirements of the defense, as it had other means available to safe-
guard its essential interests, (2) that Argentina had contributed to the situation of neces-
sity, and (3) that the State's human rights obligations did not trump its obligations to
foreign investors under the BIT.128
C. ANNuLEN T AND ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
1. Decisions on Stays of Enforcement
Following the issuance of the Kardassopoulos Award earlier this year, Georgia moved for
an unconditional stay, and the investors accepted a stay subject to a condition of secur-
ity.129 In making its Decision on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, the ad boc Com-
mittee considered the difficulty of enforcing ICSID awards in Georgia, as well as the
protracted character of the underlying dispute, and conditioned the stay on Georgia's
providing an unconditional and irrevocable bank guarantee of a reputable international
bank.sY Additionally, the Committee stated that a stay of enforcement during the annul-
ment proceeding "is by no way automatic."' 31 This contrasts with the decision of the ad
hoc Committee in Victor Pey Casado & Fondation President Allende v. Republic of Chile, which
123. Partial Award on the Merits, 1 242 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2010).
124. Id. 1 244.
125. Id. 248.
126. Id. 262.
127. Suez, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, 1 232.
128. Id. 11 238-42.
129. Kardassopoulos, Decision of the ad hoc Committee on the Stay of Enforcement of the Award, ICSID
Case Nos. ARB/05/18 and ARB/07/15, $1 27-28 (Nov. 10, 2010).
130. Id. 1 43-45.
131. Id. 1 26.
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stated that "absent unusual circumstances, the granting of a stay of enforcement pending
the outcome of the annulment proceedings has now become almost automatic."132
2. Decisions on Applications for Annulment
There were two significant (and controversial) ICSID annulment decisions this year,
both involving Argentina. In Sempra Energy International v. Argentine Republic, Argentina
requested annulment of a 2007 ICSID award holding that Argentina had breached the
FET standard and the umbrella clause of the United States-Argentina BIT.133 The ad hoc
annulment Committee annulled the award on the basis that the tribunal had disregarded
the law and that this constituted a manifest excess of its powers. 134 The Committee rea-
soned that there was a fundamental distinction to be drawn between an erroneous applica-
tion of the law, which was not a ground for annulment, and a wholesale disregard for the
applicable rules of law, which might constitute a ground for annulment if found to be a
manifest excess of the tribunal's powers.s35 The Committee concluded that the tribunal,
in failing to apply the applicable law, acted in manifest excess of powers, because it was
"obvious from a simple reading of the reasons of the tribunal that it did not identify or
apply Article XI of the BIT as the applicable law." 1 3 6
This decision provoked considerable debate and criticism, because it is unclear where
the line should be drawn between a simple error of law, which does not permit annulment
of the award, and a "manifest" error, which does. It also prompted fresh suggestions that
the present annulment system under the ICSID Convention should be revised, to be re-
placed with a more formal, investment-law appellate system.
Criticism of the annulment system was further fueled by the decision of the annulment
Committee in Compania de Aguas del Aconquiva S.A. v. Argentine Republic. Argentina filed
an application for annulment of the Award dated August 20, 2007, based on multiple
grounds under Article 52(1) of the ICSID Convention.'37 Most significantly, Argentina
sought annulment on the ground that the tribunal was not properly constituted, after
discovering, subsequent to the rendering of the award, that one of the arbitrators was a
member of the board of directors of UBS, the single largest shareholder in claimant
Vivendi Universal.138
The ad hoc Committee upheld the award but was critical of the steps taken by the arbi-
trator to determine whether a conflict of interest might arise from her directorship of
UBS.13 9 The Committee concluded that the relationship between UBS and the claimants
132. ICSID Case No. ARB/98/2, Decision on the Republic of Chile's Application for a Stay of Enforcement
of the Award, 1 25 (May 5, 2010).
133. See Sempra Energy Int'l v. Argentine Republic (U.S. v. Arg.), ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision
on the Argentine Republic's Application for Annulment of the Award, 1l (2010).
134. Id. T 219.
135. Id. 173.
136. Id. 15 209-219.
137. Compania de Aguas del Aconquiga S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision
on the Argentine Republic's Request for Annulment of the Award rendered on 20 August 2007, 2 (Aug. 10,
2010).
138. Id. 9120.
139. Id. 1 232.
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had no material impact upon the decision of the tribunal-a kind of "harmless error"
standard previously unfamiliar in ICSID jurisprudence. 140
D. PROVISIONAL MEASURES
In Quiborax S.A. v. Bolivia, the claimants initiated arbitration proceedings against Bo-
livia in October of 2005 alleging that the respondent had expropriated their property in
breach of the Bolivia-Chile BIT. Tensions escalated between the parties, and Bolivia initi-
ated criminal proceedings against several individuals involved in the claimants' Bolivian
operations.141 The claimants filed a request for provisional measures, seeking suspension
of the Bolivian criminal proceedings and alleging impairment of their rights. 142
The tribunal found that there was a clear link between the criminal proceedings and the
ongoing arbitration,143 and that the Bolivian criminal proceedings posed a threat to the
procedural integrity of the arbitration, particularly with respect to the claimants' right to
access evidence through potential witnesses. 144 Thus, if the measures were intended to
protect the procedural integrity of the arbitration, then they were by definition urgent. As
a result, the tribunal concluded that the requested provisional measures were necessary,t 45
despite Respondent's argument that the measure would violate Bolivia's sovereignty.146
V. Other Developments
In May of 2010, the International Bar Association (IBA) adopted the new IBA Rules on
the Taking of Evidence in International Arbitration. The new rules apply to all arbitra-
tions in which the parties agree to apply them, whether as part of new arbitration agree-
ments, or in determining the rules of procedure in a pending or future arbitration.147
In June of 2010, UNCITRAL adopted the revised UNCITRAL arbitration rules,
which went into effect on August 15, 2010. The revised arbitration rules will apply to any
new arbitration agreements adopting the UNCITRAL Rules that are concluded after Au-
gust 15, 2010, unless the parties have agreed otherwise.148
There have also been several noteworthy developments in national arbitration laws.
Ireland passed the Arbitration Act of 2010 that incorporates the entire text of the UNCI-
TRAL Model Law. 149 The act applies to all arbitrations commenced in Ireland after the
date the act came into operation and does away with the historical distinction between
140. Id. 1 238.
141. ICSID Case No. ARB/06/2, Decision on Provisional Measures, 13 29-32 (Feb. 26, 2010).
142. Id. 46-64.
143. Id. 1 121.
144. Id. 1 148.
145. Id. 11 153, 163.
146. Id. 1 164.
147. See IBA Announces Approval of Revised Evidence Rules, rNT'L BARP ASs'N, http://www.ibanet.org/Article/
Detail.aspx?ArticleUid=AD2E4AFA-F3E5-4009-99BC-6745C8B97648 (last visited Jan. 22, 2011).
148. See Press Release, Revised UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules Adopted, U.N. Press Release UNIS/L/139
(June 29, 2010), available at http://www.unis.unvienna.org/unis/pressrels/2010/unisll39.html; UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, art. 1(2)(2010).
149. See Arbitration Act 2010 (Act No. 1/2010) (Ir.) § 6, available at http://www.irishstatutebookie/2010/en/
act/pub/0001/print.html.
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domestic and international arbitration. 50 Similarly, Hong Kong passed a new Arbitration
Ordinance that adopts a single regime based on the UNCITRAL Model Law for domes-
tic and international arbitration.' 5 The new Ordinance, passed in November 2010, sig-
nificantly reforms arbitration law in Hong Kong but will likely not become effective until
sometime in 2011. Singapore's International Arbitration Act was also recently amended
in part to provide that a court may grant interim measures in aid of arbitration irrespective
of whether the arbitration is seated in Singapore.152
150. See id. §§ 3, 6.
151. See Arbitration Ordinance, No. 17/2010, (2010) (H.K) §§ 4, 5, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/
yrIO-1 l/english/ord/ord017-10-e.pdf.
152. See International Arbitration (Amendment) Bill, 2009 (Bill No. 20/2009) (Sing.) § 4, available at http://
www.parliament.gov.sg/Publications/090020.pdf
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